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COMMENTS

REMEDY IN TORT FOR WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH TESTAMENTARY INTENT
The remedies available to one when his expectations of taking as legatee
under another's will are not realized due to the fraudulent intervention or
duress of a third party, resulting in no will being executed or an existing
one revoked, present a problem with which the courts have increasingly
had to contend. Although the legal remedy is the relief discussed here,
both the legal and the equitable branches of the law must be considered in
seeking a remedy.'
Although not within the scope of this comment, it would be well to
mention that the remedy in equity has developed to such a point that it is
generally conceded that the fraudulent wrongdoer will be declared a constructive trustee for the benefit of the defrauded party, 2 particularly if the
wrongdoer has used false promises to sway the testator s
The general assumption, often unspoken, is that the various statutes of
wills, in prescribing mandatory forms for revocation or establishment of a
will, are no bar to the granting of relief, either in law or in equity. It is
reasoned that the plaintiff is not attacking the probate decree, as the relief
granted operates on the legatee personally, the decree itself not being
affected.

4

In both law and equity it has been almost universally held that there
must be a clear showing that the effect of the fraud continued up to the
death of the testator; that but for the fraud of the defendant, plaintiff
would have been the object of the testator's bounty.5 The possibility of
the testator making devises or bequests independently of the fraud must
be considered.
The remedy at law, in an action in tort for damages, has been shrouded
' Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Co., 34 Ill. App. 379, 96 N.E. 2d 831 (1951),
a case of first impression in Illinois, provides an interesting discussion of the various
remedies. As no fraud was found to exist, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether it would allow any relief.
2
Prosser, Torts io14-16 ('94i); it A.L.R. zd 8o8 (1950); Ransdel v. Moore, 153
Ind. 393, 53 N.E. 767 (1899). See i Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 5 155 (sth ed.,
1941); Rest., Restitution
184, Comment i (1937).
1
8 Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N.E. 767 (1899); Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk.
539 (1747); Thynn v. Thynn, i Vern. 296 (1684). Cases are collected in 66 A.L.R.
156 (1930); 155 A.L.R. io6 (1945); z6 R.C.L. 1241, n. to (199).
4 Latham v. Father Divine, z99 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E. zd i68 (1949); Brazil v. Silva, 181
Cal. 490, 185 Pac. 174 (1919). Contra: Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 1oo Ad. 441 (1917);
Axe v. Wilson, 15o Kan. 794, 96 P. zd 88o (1939).
5 Hegarty v. Hegarty, 46 F. Supp. 319 (D.C. Mass., 1942); Lewis v. Corbin, 195
Mass. 5zo, 81 N.E. 248 (1907). Cf. Mitchell v. Langley, 8 S.E. 1050, 143 Ga. 827
(1915).
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in uncertainty, with few serious attempts by the courts to analyze the
problem. Perhaps because of this lack of understanding, the remedy has
been seldom attempted, and with the courts sharing this uncertainty, there
have been very few direct holdings on the question.6
There can readily be visualized a situation where the defrauder has
disposed of or damaged the fraudulently obtained property, or where his
fraud has caused the property to be left, not to him, but to a third, and
innocent party. In the latter instance, equity would be of little avail to the
injured party in those jurisdictions holding that a constructive trust will
not be declared where the defendant has in no way been instrumental in
7
fraudulently obtaining the bequest.
In the jurisdictions which have touched upon the problem, two main
views seem to have emerged: some denying the relief, and others by dicta
indicating that they would allow it were the proper set of facts squarely
presented.
This problem of tort remedy was first touched upon in the United States
in the oft-cited case of Hutchins v. Hutchins," in 1845. In that case the
plaintiff alleged that his father had devised certain lands to him, and that
defendant, by fraudulent means and defamation of plaintiff, induced the
father to revoke the will and execute a new one under which plaintiff
received nothing. The court, in holding that such a statement of facts did
not state a cause of action, said:
At best, the contemplated gift was not to be realized till after the death of
the testator... or the testator might change his mind, or lose his property. In
short, the plaintiff had no interest in the property of which he says he has been
dcprived by the fraudulent interference of the defendant, beyond a mere naked
possibility. .. which is altogether too shadowy and evanescent to be dealt with
by courts of law.9
It is to be noted that the court placed much emphasis on the possibility
that the expectancy of the plaintiff mgiht not materialize, regardless of the
fraud. The obvious query is what the decision would have been had there
nThere have been only two unequivocal holdings that the action will not lie, and
not one holding that there is such a cause of action co-extensive with a finding of
fraud. The cases are all treated herein.
- No trust was allowed in the following cases against the innocent legatee: Dye v.
Parker. io8 Kan. 304, 194 Pac. 640 (1921), noted in S Minn. L. Rev. 488 (1921); Heinisch v. Pennington, 73 N.J. Eq. 456, 68 Atd. 233 (Ch., 1907), aff'd 75 N.J. Eq. 6o6, 73"
Atl. it18 (9o9). It was allowed in: Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W. 2d S59
(1948), noted in 37 Ky. L. Rev. 113 (1948), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 598 (949); Bohannon
v. Trotman, 214 N.C. 706, ,oo S.E. 852 (1939).
87 Hill (N.Y.) 104 (1845).
9 Ibid., at io. For the present judicial outlook on this case in New York, see Latham
v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E. 2d 168 (949) in which the case was offered by
counsel to support their contention that equity would not fasten a constructive trust
on a fraudulent legatee. The Hutchins case, said the court, was to be limited strictly
to its holding, i.e., no cause of action in tort was present.
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been a showing that the fraud remained operative until the testator's
death.
The court, in passing, noted that it had not lost sight of the fact that in
certain actions, such as slander, damages were recoverable for interference
with mere expectancies, but stated that that principle should be regarded
as peculiar to that species of injury.10
Shortly thereafter, in 1855, a Louisiana court"1 held, regrettably with
but little discussion of the problem, that an action in tort will lie against
one who by force and violence has prevented a person from making a
will in favor of the plaintiff. 12 Thus was posed a fundamental difference
of opinion, both cases gaining adherents in subsequent decisions.
The reasoning of the Hutchins case was followed in a comparatively
recent Ohio decision, 1 3 in which a husband who would inherit his wife's
estate if she died intestate, forcibly prevented her from executing a will
leaving her property to plaintiff. The court emphatically stated that, as
plaintiff had a mere expectancy, he could base no cause of action upon it.
In the case of Hall v. Hall,1 4 relief was refused, but on different reasoning. Plaintiff alleged fraud of the defendants in making false representations to the testator, by reason of which defendants were made sole beneficiaries in his will; defendants were also charged with preventing plaintiff
from opposing probate of the will, whereby plaintiff was deprived of his
inheritance. In a somewhat confusing decision, the court first said that the
fraud was practiced on the testator, and not on plaintiff, but then went on
to hold that "the decree of the Court of Probate stands in the plaintiff's
way, unless and until he obtains an adjudication removing it from his
path."15
The reasoning in the case would seem to be unsound. In an action for
damages such as this, the plaintiff is not collaterally attacking the decree,
but is admitting its validity, and is suing the defendant personally for his
fraud. The sole result of the probate decree is to put the defendant in the
position where, if the plaintiff has no remedy, the defendant will benefit
by his fraud. Possibly with this in mind, the court intimated that plaintiff
would have had a cause of action had he sought equitable relief. 16
10 Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill (N.Y.) 104, 109 (1845).
1 Kelly v. Kelly, io La. Ann. 62z (1855).
12The courts have apparently made no distinction between those cases in which
fraud has been the wrong complained of, and those in which force was used. They
have cited the cases indiscriminately, and have used the same reasoning in both types
of cases.
"3Cunningham v. Edwards, 52 Ohio App. 61, 3 N.E. zd 58 (936), noted in 23 Va.
L. Rev. 220 (1936), and 5 Fordham L. Rev. 514 (1936).
1491

Conn. 514,

1oo

Atl. 441 (1917), critically noted in 27 Yale L. J. 263 (1917).

15 Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, 521, 1oo At. 441, 443 ('917).
16 Ibid., at 523 and 444.
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Dicta in Lewis v. Corbin," the case most cited as approving such relief,
seems to indicate that the remedy in tort would be allowed. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant, residuary legatee, fraudulently induced testator to
execute a codicil which was invalid because the statutory number of witnesses was not present. This invalidity was unknown to testator, who intended to leave a legacy to plaintiff's father. Defendant's demurrer was
sustained, but the court said that if plaintiff's pleading had averred fraud
up until the testator's death, a good cause of action would have been
stated. The court inferred that the decision in the Hutchins case might
have been different had the same thing been shown there.18
North Carolina has held that such a cause of action exists-although
damages were not actually awarded.' Plaintiff alleged that defendant had
fraudulently caused decedent to change a fixed plan of distribution, favorable to plaintiff, which he had intended to fulfill by will or trust. The
court,
rendering its decision, said: "It is true that such a cause of action
may bein difficult
to prove-but that does not touch the existence of the
20
cause of action, but only its establishment.
A federal district court, applying Massachusetts law, denied defendant's
motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff had stated a good cause of action
in alleging that defendant fraudulently induced decedent to transfer all
his property to defendants, with the intent of defeating plaintiff's right of
inheritance. 21 The court made note of the fact that plaintiff had specifideath. Upon the trial of
cally alleged fraud up to the time of the testator's
22
the case, however, no fraud was found to exist.
The trend of the cases would seem to be toward allowing the action.
This is in accord with reason and the law in situations which present similar problems. It must be noted, however, that in no case have damages
actually been awarded.
Although there are no decisions on the point, it would seem on general
tort principles that if the legatee did not participate in the fraud, he is
against him.
guilty of no wrong, and the defrauded party is remediless
23
This objection is often of little importance in ecuity.
With the paucity of decided cases on the instant problem, it is helpful
to consider the solutions found to problems in analogous fields. The position of a beneficiary in an insurance policy in which the right to change
the beneficiary is reserved, would seem analogous to that of a legatee under
17 195 Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907).
IsIbid., at 526 and 250.

19Bohanon v.
Va. L. Rev. 614
,0 Bohanon v.
21 Hegarty v.
22 Hegarty v.
23 Authorities

Wachovia, 21o N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936). See critical note in 23
(1936).
Wachovia, 21o N.C. 679, 684, 188 S.E. 390, 394 (1936).
Hegarty, 46 F. Supp. 319 (D.C. Mass., 1942).
Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D.C. Mass., 1943).
cited note 7 supra.
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a will: they are both possessed of no more than a mere expectancy. 24 If it
be argued that the insurance policy is in the nature of a third party beneficiary contract, it only need be answered that, if so, it is a contract terminable at will, and no rights vest in the beneficiary until the death of
the insured.
A foundation case in this field is Mitchell v. Langley.2 Defendant had
fraudulently induced the insured to change the beneficiary in a benefit
policy from plaintiff to defendant. The court, by dicta, answered the
instant problem when it said: "There is such a status that an action
'20
will lie."
This case seems to be in accord with the better authority in its field, although there are contrary holdings, most of them leaning on the "no legal
27
rights" doctrine.
An even stronger analogy appears to lie in the field of interference with
advantageous relations. 28 As far back as the Year Books,9 such a wrong
seems to have been recognized, and a remedy provided therefore, although the leading case of Temperton v. RusselP° was not decided until
1893. That case extended the doctrine of earlier cases by expressly recognizing as actionable an interference with a purely prospective contractual
relationship. Today the general rule in this country is that an interference
with a prospective economic advantage is actionable, 31 though based on a
pure expectancy.
It has been suggested that the degree of probability that plaintiff would
take under testator's will be ascertained, and damages apportioned accordingly. 2 Although otherwise sound, the difficulty of ascertaining such
nebulous matters as "probabilities" would seem to make itimpractical.
Although in the business field of prospective contracts, such practice has
become accepted, it must be remembered that business, in many respects,
has become almost a science, so that the determining of possible loss sustained is far from conjectural. In a situation such as we have here, the
difficulties incident to ascertaining the precise degree of probability would
2429
25 143

Am.Jur., Insurance S lz76 (i94o); Vance, Insurance, 559-64 (2d ed., 1930).
Ga.827, 85 S.E. 1050 (1915).

28 Ibid., at 831 and 1053.
27

The action was allowed in Daugherty v. Daugherty, 15z Ky. 732, 154 S.W. 9

(1913). Contra: Hoeft v.Supreme Lodge, 113 Cal. 91, 45 Pac. 185 (1896). For a general discussion, see 105 A.L.R. 950, 957 (1936).
28See Bohanon v. Wachovia, 21o N.C. 679, 188 SE. 390 (1936).
29Prosser,

Torts 1O14 n.59 (1941).
[1893] xQ.B. 715.
81 A great many cases are listed and discussed inProsser, Torts S§io5, io6 (1941).
See Lewis v. Bloede, zoz Fed. 7 (C.C.A., i912); 84 A.L.R. 43, 6o (1933).
3248 Harv. L.Rev.984 (1935); Prosser, Torts 1017 n.81 (1941).
80

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

seem to require that damages, if awarded, be either purely nominal, or the
full amount of the legacy or devise. The possibility of awarding nominal
damages would answer those who decry awarding any damages at all, the
basis of their opinion being the impracticability of ascertaining what the
testator would have done but for the fraud.
With the increasing realization that the true function of the law is to
do justice, and the tendency to discard pat and arbitrary formulas, particularly in realizing that expectancies in many areas should be afforded the
protection of the law, it is to be expected that the right to a remedy at law,
in the problem herein discussed, will come to be firmly established. Its
dangers must not be overlooked; the fraud must clearly be shown to be
the ultimate cause of plaintiff's disappointment. To use the more familiar
language of torts, the fraud must be shown to be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's loss. But, when these conditions are met, the remedy in tort
should be invaluable when equity affords no protection.
COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE IN EQUITY
Equity's extraordinary jurisdiction in granting relief is well-known and
settled. However, within this vast, broad body of equitable principles
there exists a rather obscure doctrine which may, be termed "the doctrine
of comparative intelligence." This doctrine sters from the fact that it is
a principle of law and equity as well as of natural justice that a greater
degree of consideration and care is due persons who are unable to care for
themselves than to persons who are able. Interwoven with other discretionary defenses, the doctrine has been used primarily to defeat actions for
the specific performance of contracts. Courts generally do not acknowledge the existence of the "doctrine of comparative intelligence" by name;
nevertheless, from a study of cases, it is apparent that the principles underlying the doctrine are being and have been applied in certain instances.
Before discussing "comparative intelligence," it is necessary to discuss
briefly some of the discretionary defenses to affirmative equitable relief.
In general, a court of equity will not interfere to relieve either party to
a contract, fairly entered into, from its binding effects because of the
wisdom or folly of 1the contract or because of bad business judgment; a
bargain is a bargain.
But, specific performance is not a right; 2 it is granted in the discretion
of the court according to general rules and principles. 3 For instance, the
complainant must show the contract is not unjust or oppressive to the
defendant. 4 Specific relief may be denied on the ground that the defendant
1 Knott v. Cutler, 224 N.C. 427, 31 S.E. Ad 359 (1944).
2
3

Beard v. Morgan, 143 Neb. 503, io N.W. 2d 253 (1943).
London v. Doering, 325 Ill. 589, 156 N.E. 793 (1927).

4Stone v. Pratt, 25 U1. 6 (x86o).

